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INTRODUCTION
As the ever-increasing volume of world trade creates a greater
interdependence among nations, perhaps no provision of American
law figures more prominently in the future of American foreign trade
than the controversial Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.1 Ad-
Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 479 § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703, (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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ministered by the International Trade Commission (ITC),2 this trade
statute declares unlawful:
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of
which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently
and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the
establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade
and commerce in the United States.'
For years, this competitively-couched statute labored in relative ob-
scurity due to its virtual insignificance on the international scene. The
Trade Act of 1974, 4 however, revitalized Section 337 and in doing so
2 Originally designated the United States Tariff Commission, the ITC was created
by Act of Congress and approved on September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 795). The name
was changed to the United States International Trade Commission by § 171 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 2009) to reflect that act's emphasis upon non-tariff trade
barriers. Other than the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC's present powers and duties
can be found in the Antidumping Act of 1921, the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For a descriptive chronicle of the ITC, see generally,
J. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARiFFs: THE BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CoMaIssioN (1976).
3 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
The ITC is accorded wide discretion in determining what practices constitute unfair
acts under the statute. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Von
Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955), stated:
the quoted language [of the statute] is broad and inclusive and should not
be held to be limited to acts coming within the technical definition of unfair
methods of competition as applied in some decisions. The importation of
articles may involve questions which differ materially from any arising in
purely domestic competition, and it is evident from the language used that
Congress intended to allow wide discretion in determining what practices
are to be regarded as unfair.
Id. at 443-44.
Though the language is defined broadly, the great majority of cases brought under
Section 337 have involved intellectual property rights: trademarks, copyrights and
especially patents. See Palmeter, The U.S. International Trade Commission at Com-
mon Law, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497 (1984). Other cases, however, have also found
unfair methods of competition or unfair acts under the statute to include: palming
off, false designation of origin, deceptive advertising and such antitrust violations as
predatory pricing, price-fixing, and conspiracy to restrain trade. See Duvall, The Rule
of Law in International Trade: Litigating Unfair Import Trade Practice Cases Before
the United States International Trade Commission, 15 LAW. OF THE Am. 31, 32
(1983). See also Comment, Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade Practices
Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 234, 247-
51 (1982).
4 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as
amended in several sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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established the ITC as the forum of choice for foreign unfair com-
petition claims. Possessing the total exclusion order as its ultimate
prize, domestic holders of intellectual property rights have increasingly
sought the "fast track" of Section 337 to protect their rights against
foreign infringements.' Due to its increased use, the question of whether
the administration of Section 337 operates against unfair competition
or actually protects domestic industries from legitimate foreign com-
petition has become a subject of much debate. 6
Central to the controversy surrounding Section 337 are the rules of
procedure by which the ITC governs its investigations. 7 Both foreign
and domestic producers have criticized the administration of this
section pursuant to these rules. The domestic producers claim that
despite the more effective protection afforded by the ITC, its pro-
cedures are still too expensive for all but the largest companies to
defend their intellectual property rights.' Foreign producers, on the
other hand, claim that the procedures utilized by the ITC are already
less favorable to respondents (usually foreign producers) than the
procedures in the United States courts and thereby result in a denial
of national treatment contrary to Article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. 9 Recently, the Commission of the European
Communities (Commission) amplified this debate over Section 337 in
its decision Re United States Litigation Between E.L DuPont de
5 As of September 30, 1986, there were twenty-one Section 337 investigations
pending, 1986 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Ann. Rep. 60-61; on September 30, 1979,
there were fifteen Section 337 cases pending, see 1979 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Ann.
Rep. 13; and on September 30, 1976, there were eight Section 337 cases pending,
1976 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Ann. Rep. 9. See generally Comment, supra note 3,
at 236 n.5.
6 As one commentator suggests, one's view of this debate may depend upon his
or her perspective. Proponents generally agree that Section 337 "affords a valuable
avenue of relief" to domestic industries, while critics contend that the section is "a
major non-tariff trade barrier." Hemmendinger, Barringer and Kossel, Section 337:
A Case for Repeal or Change, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 81, 81 (1978).
1 The ITC procedural rules pursuant to Section 337 are codified at 19 C.F.R. §
210.1-.26 (1987).
' See, e.g., No Harm, No Foul: The Elimination of the Injury Test in Section
337 Proceedings, Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 112 F.R.D. 439, 532 (1986).
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. III. Both the United States
and the Netherlands are signatories. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
is both an international agreement and an international organization. For purposes
of this Note, the international agreement will be denoted as the General Agreement
or Agreement and the international organization will be referred to as the GATT.
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Nemours & Co. and AKZO N. V.10 In that decision the Commission
held that the application of Section 337, to the particular facts of
that case, violated the national treatment provision of the General
Agreement." The Commission, considering it in the EEC's interests to
have GATT address the compatibility of Section 337 and Article III
of the General Agreement, initiated the international consultation and
dispute settlement procedures of the GATT.' 2
The following Note analyzes the ITC's administration of Section
337 and its consistency with United States international obligations
under the GATT, specifically the national treatment provision of
Article III. The international dispute involving AKZO' 3 and DuPont,
which represents the much-anticipated test-case concerning Section 337,
will be utilized as the primary vehicle to demonstrate the denial of
national treatment in the statute's administration. In light of the
GATT's previous treatment of this statute' 4 and considering the ec-
onomic and political implications of this case, this Note challenges
the GATT panel to confront the issue and deliver a definitive legal
ruling. Finally, this Note discusses the importance of such a GATT
decision to the future of Section 337.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Perspective of Section 337
Congress first announced federal legislation targeting unfair methods
of competition in Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922.'1 The 1922
,o 30 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 117) 18 (1987), 2 COMMON MKT. L. R. 545, 546
(1987) (hereinafter Commission Decision).
2 COMMON MKT. L. R. at 549.
12 Id. at 550. See infra note 73-84 and accompanying text.
3 For purposes of this Note, AKZO will be used generally to refer to AKZO and
its affiliated companies. AKZO is primarily a holding company providing various
financial and management services to its subsidiaries. ENKZ B.V., Aramide Maat-
schappij v.o.f. and AKZONA Inc. are all subsidiaries of AKZO involved in the
manufacture or distribution of aramid fiber.
l4 Section 337 has been the subject of a GATT Panel Conciliation in one previous
case, United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, reprinted in
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFs AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOcUMENTS 107 (30th Supp. 1984) [hereinafter Spring Assemblies 11].
,1 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 943-44. Commonly known as the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff, the Tariff Act of 1922 passed in response to a public
mandate to return to the traditional pre-war protectionist philosophy. See J. DoBSON,
supra note 2, at 31.
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Act's main feature was an elastic tariff empowering the President to
vary duties on imports to equalize costs of production and thereby
remove any competitive disadvantage. 16 Congress, believing unfair
methods of competition to be the only means to circumvent the tariff,
designed Section 316 as a shield for this economic scheme by requiring
the Tariff Commission to conduct investigations and make recom-
mendations to the President toward remedying these unfair practices.17
In turn, Section 316 authorized the President to protect domestic
producers and their particular industries by imposing an additional
duty on the imported product or, in extreme cases, excluding the
-imported article altogether. I" Hence, Section 337, through its prede-
cessor, Section 316, was originally designed to champion a protective
tariff. 19
The Tariff Act of 1930 represented the high-water mark of pro-
tectionism in the United States. 20 Though renumbered Section 337,
16 This elastic tariff was patterned after the Harding Administration's principle of
scientific tariff protection. Upon the recommendation of the Tariff Commission, the
President could adjust tariff rates up or down by as much as fifty percent (50%) to
equalize costs of production. Id. at 33. See also Musrey, Tariff Act's Section 337:
Vehicle for the Protection and Extension of Monopolies, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
56, 60 (1973).
1' Tariff Act of 1922, § 316(b), (c), and (d). Section 316 provided in pertinent
part:
(b) That to assist the President in making any decisions under this section
the United States Tariff Commission is hereby authorized to investigate any
alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or upon its initiative.
(c) That the commission shall make such investigation under and in accor-
dance with such rules as it may promulgate and give such notice and afford
such hearing, and when deemed proper by the commission such rehearing
with opportunity to offer evidence, oral or written, as it may deem sufficient
for a full presentation of the facts involved in such investigation; ...
(d) That the final findings of the commission shall be transmitted with the
record to the President.
Id.
Commenting on the purpose of Section 316, Senator Smoot, a member of the
Senate Finance Committee, explained: "If any doubt whatever exists as to the ef-
fectiveness of the tariff rates and the provisions of the elastic tariff as a means to
protect the coal-tar dye industries, the addition of this effective unfair competition
statute should remove it." 62 CONG. REC. 879 (1922). Senator Smoot further
explained that Section 316 was to be a law with teeth to it - one which would reach
all forms of unfair competition in importation. Id.
11 Tariff Act of 1922, § 316(e).
'9 For an article positing that section 337, and its predecessor section 316, is
administered to protect and promote illegal domestic monopolies, see Musrey, supra
note 20, at 56.
20 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 479, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended at
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Section 316 substantively changed very little, with the Tariff Com-
mission continuing in its advisory role to the President. 21 The most
important of the changes concerned the section's remedies. By elim-
inating Presidential authority to levy additional duties, Section 337
rendered the exclusion order the sole available remedy. 22 This act also
provided for the admittance of articles temporarily excluded under
bond2 3 and eliminated direct Supreme Court review of Tariff Com-
mission findings. 24 On the books, Section 337 remained firm in its
protectionist conviction until the Trade Act of 1974;25 its role in
safeguarding the interests of United States producers, however, less-
ened significantly during those years as protectionist philosophy gave
way to ideas of liberal trade. 26
The Trade Act of 1974 restructured United States trade policy in
order to promote the development of liberal free trade competition
through the elimination of trade barriers. Principally, the 1974 Act
authorized the President to negotiate and enter into trade agreements
with foreign countries "for the purpose of establishing fairness and
equity in international trading relations. ' ' 27 This organization sought
to coordinate United States policy with the General Agreement and
to encourage the extension of free trade ideals into areas not yet
embraced by the General Agreement. 28 Although the 1974 Act un-
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. iii 1985)). Also known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,
the Tariff Act of 1930 set up the highest general tariff rate structure in the history
of the United States. J. DOBSON, supra note 2, at 33-35.
21 The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 651, 46 Stat. 590, 762, repealed section 316
of the Tariff Act of 1922.
- Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337(e), 46 Stat. 590, 704 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1982)).
23 Id. § 337(0 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (1982)).
24 Id. § 337(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
23 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified throughout
Title 19 of the United States Code). Although the statutory language of Section 337
remained unchanged, some amendments were made as provisions became clarified
through case law. Foremost among these amendments was the extension of the
protected position enoyed by owners of product patents to owners of process patents.
See In re Amtorg Trading Corp. 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935); cert. denied, 296
U.S. 576 (1935).
2 For a description of the progressive role of U.S. tariffs as the protectionist
philosophy eroded, see J. DoBsoN, supra note 2.
27 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S.
REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 193, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMhN. NEws 7186, 7186 [hereinafter FiNANCE CoMm. REP.].
2B Id. at 7203.
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derscores United States commitment to an open world economy,
Congress recognized that such a system was only possible on a basis
of reciprocity and equal competitive opportunity. 29 The 1974 Act
ensured this opportunity by recasting executive authority to respond
to foreign unfair trade practices. 30 In the area of unfair import practices
this meant a redefinition and revitalization of Section 337.31
The 1974 Act renamed the Tariff Commission the International
Trade Commission, and Section 337, as amended, vested the ITC with
full authority to investigate any alleged violations of the statute, 32
make a final determination of violation,33 and then to invoke a suitable
remedy.34 Intending a swift response to unfair trade practices, Congress
mandated that the ITC conduct its investigations and make any de-
termination of violation and remedy within twelve months. 5 As the
role of the ITC changed from advisory to quasi-adjudicatory, its
proceedings became subject to the notice and hearing requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 6 The Act authorized the
ITC to consider "all legal and equitable defenses, ' 3 7 with any party
adversely affected permitted an appeal to the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, now the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC). 38 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
29 Id.
30 Id. at 7208.
11 For an article discussing how these changes enhanced the stature of the ITC,
see Note, The Revitalization of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 Under the
Trade Act of 1974, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 167 (1976). For a thorough examination
of the 1974 amendments see Kaye and Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade Causes
in the Importation of Goods: An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337 (pts.
1 & 2), 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 208, 269 (1975).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1982) Title III, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053 (1975). Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618.
11 Id. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) Title III, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053 (1975).
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618.
3, Id. § 1337(d)(e) & (f) (1982) Title IIl, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053 (1975). Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618.
31 The general policy of expedition is stated in 19 C.F.R. § 210.2 (1987) and reads:
It is the policy of the Commission that, to the extent practicable and consistent
with requirements of law, such proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously.
In the conduct of such proceedings, the administrative law judge and counsel
or other representative for each party shall make every effort at each stage
of the proceedings to avoid delay.
Id.
36 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. III 1985). Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 500-576 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (See supra note 33 for full text).
38 Id., 19 C.F.R. § 210.71. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was abolished
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1974 Act shifted the emphasis of the Section 337 proceeding from
the protection of private rights to the much greater responsibility of
guarding the public interest.3 9 Thus, the ITC will not issue a remedial
order where its effects are determined detrimental to the public. 40
B. The General Agreement and Article III
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4 is a multi-nation
pact designed to facilitate the elimination of discriminatory treatment
in international commerce and as a framework for the progressive
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. Though not a treaty,
the General Agreement is customarily accorded the same efficacy as
a treaty under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 42
in 1982 and review of Section 337 investigations was given to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-164, Title I, § 105(a), 96 Stat. 27, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
19 See supra note 34. The Senate Finance Committee explained, "[the Commitee
believes that the public health and welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions
in the United States economy must be the overriding considerations in the admin-
istration of this statute." FINANCE Comm. REP., supra note 27 at 7330.
To assure these conditions, each Section 337 proceeding will address essentially
five legal issues: 1) jurisdiction; 2) whether an unfair act or unfair method of
competition exists; 3) what is the domestic industry; 4) whether the domestic industry
is efficiently and economically operated; and 5) whether the unfair acts have the
effect or tendency of substantially injuring the domestic industry. As a practical
matter, during a Section 337 investigation jurisdiction is rarely a problem as most
proceedings are conducted in rem. The ITC has found the unfair act in a number
of ways including patent infringement, trademark infringement, and theft of trade
secrets. The domestic industry is usually defined according to the exploitation of the
patent approach defining the industry as the patentee and its suppliers. No domestic
industry has ever been denied relief due to lack of efficient operation. Finally, the
injury requirement is a very low standard which may be satisfied by a simple threat
of lower prices from a competitor. For a more complete discussion of each legal
issue addressed in a Section 337 investigation and the manner in which each is
resolved, see Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United States
International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L L. J. 345, 437-447 (1985).
The ITC also has the option of initiating its own investigation in the public's
interest, see 19 C.F.R. § 210.58; however, this option is seldom exercised. See Certain
Apparatus for Flow Injection Analysis and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1665,
Inv. No. 337-TA-157 (Nov. 1984).
4 See, e.g., Automatic Crankpin Grinders, USITC Pub. 1022, Inv. No. 337-TA-
60 (Dec. 1979). (The Commission determined there was a violation of Section 337
but concluded public interest factors precluded imposition of remedies).
41 See supra note 9.
42 The General Agreement was never submitted to nor ratified by the U.S. Senate.
It is an executive agreement entered into by the President pursuant to authority
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Thus, United States commercial policy concerning internal trade reg-
ulation is subject to the nation's international obligations. 43
The General Agreement operates by setting forth broad prohibitions
against certain activities and then allowing those activities only where
they fall within an exception expressly enumerated in the Agreement. 44
Though the Agreement does not specifically address unfair trade
practices, paragraph two of Article III, commonly known as the
national treatment provision, provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transpor-
tation, distribution or use.
45
Thus, in the area of foreign trade, any nation extending trade ad-
vantages to domestic producers through internal regulation must also
extend these advantages to foreign producers seeking access to United
States markets. 46
Where advantages afforded to domestic producers are not similarly
extended to foreign producers, such differential treatment may only
be justified within an express exception. 47 Article XX(d), for example,
provides an express exception for domestic laws and regulations con-
cerning the protection of intellectual property rights. 4 This exception,
granted him by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 943 (1943),
as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1958). The United States Supreme Court has held
that international agreements which are negotiated and proclaimed by the President
are "treaties" within the supremacy clause. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
330-32 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also Cardozo, The
Authority in Internal Law of International Treaties: The Pink Case, 13 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 544, 553 (1962).
43 Id.
- For an in-depth examination of the General Agreement, its purpose, arrange-
ments, and emergence, see generally K. DAM, TrE GATT: LAW AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL EcoNoMic ORGANIZATION (1970).
4 GATT, supra note 9, art. III, 2, 61 Stat. (Part II) A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700
(1947), amended by 62 Stat. (Part III) 3681 para. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 1890 (1948).
4 See id.
4 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48 GATT, supra note 9, Article XX provides for general exceptions and reads in
part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
1988]
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however, is subject to certain conditions, the most relevant being that
the exception must be "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not [otherwise] inconsistent with the provision
of this Agreement." 49 Where the exception is inapplicable, any resulting
inferior treatment violates the Agreement.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF SECTION 337 BEFORE THE GATT
The AKZO/DuPont dispute marks only the second time a GATT
Panel ° will examine certain aspects of Section 337.51 The first Panel
to do so resulted from the ITC decision in In Re Spring Assemblies
on international trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with the laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies
operated under paragraph four of Article II and Article XIII, the
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention
of deceptive practices ....
49 Id.
10 Though the General Agreement promotes negotiation as its pri-
mary dispute resolution mechanism, the agreement does provide a
skeletal provision for the adjudication of trade disputes. Article XXIII
provides:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and
shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such repre-
sentation as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any
matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting
party, consult with any contracting parties in respect of any matter for
which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through con-
sultation under paragraph 1.
As developed, the panel procedure begins when complaints submitted to the Con-
tracting Parties are referred to a "panel of experts," usually consisting of five members
who represent neutral countries. The Panel conducts evidentiary hearings where both
parties are allowed to present their cases. After these hearings, the Panel delivers its
findings of fact and ruling on the merits in a written recommendation to the Con-
tracting Parties. Unless one of the parties objects, approval is usually automatic. For
a critical analysis of this dispute resolution mechanism see Hudec, Thames Essays,
ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES (1978).
1' See supra note 14 for the first GATT examination of Section 337.
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and Components Thereof (Spring Assemblies 1).12 In Spring Assemblies
I the ITC determined that a Canadian importer of automotive spring
assemblies violated Section 337 on the grounds "that the spring as-
semblies infringed a United States patent and were the product of a
process which, if practiced in the United States, would infringe a
United States patent, the effect or tendency of which was to sub-
stantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated in
the United States." 53 The ITC subsequently ordered that imports of
the assemblies from all sources be excluded from entry and sale in
the United States.5 4
In response to the ITC's exclusion order Canada requested the
establishment of a GATT panel, pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of the
General Agreement, to reconcile the differential treatment of imported
goods which resulted from the application of Section 337 .5 Canada
advanced three main arguments before the Panel to demonstrate the
"protectionist purpose and effect of Section 337. ' '56 First, Canada
argued that the term "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts"
served as a general term applied in all types of cases, including patent
cases, wherever its use would protect a domestic industry.17 Canada
conceded that GATT Article XX allowed for certain exceptions to
the national treatment provision but denied the existence of any pro-
vision authorizing differential treatment based on grounds of "unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts" found in Section 337.58
Secondly, Canada argued that with respect to patent law, foreign
producers received treatment less favorable than domestic producers
through their exposure to double jeopardy. 9 Canada explained that
a domestic patentholder in a patent infringement dispute with a do-
mestic producer could only seek remedy in a United States civil court,
52 In Re Spring Assemblies and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1172, Inv.
No. 337-TA-88, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1426 (Aug. 1981) [hereinafter Spring Assemblies
11.
" Id. at 1446. These spring assemblies were used exclusively in certain automatic
transmissions of General Motors and Ford automobiles. Id. at 1429.
14 Id. at 1446-1447.
" In communications with the contracting parties Canada certified that written
representations to and consultations with the United States had been held concerning
the Spring assemblies case without satisfactory solution. As a result, on November
3, 1981, Canada requested the establishment of a GATT panel. Spring Assemblies
H, supra note 14, at 107.
36 Id. at 111-14.
I d.
58 Spring Assemblies I, supra note 14, at 111. See also supra note 48.
19 Spring Assemblies H, supra note 14, at 112.
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while the same patentholder in a dispute over patents with a foreign
producer could seek remedy either in a United States civil court,
before the ITC, or both.6 Canada believed the potential for harassment
to be obvious, since this procedure subjected the importer to separate
proceedings before separate bodies.6' Moreover, Canada asserted, the
United States was well aware that duplicative proceedings were in-
ternationally disfavored. 62
Canada's last major argument concerned the many disadvantages
facing the respondent in a Section 337 proceeding as compared to
similarly-situated respondents before a United States civil court. 63 Can-
ada asserted that procedurally the ITC utilized different rules of
evidence and burdens of proof than did a federal court. In addition,
Canada claimed that ITC representatives interposed government rep-
resentation into patent disputes, that the twelve-month time limit often
provided insufficient time for a complete presentation of the case,
and that all legal and equitable defenses were not available as a
respondent could not counterclaim before the ITC.64 Canada claimed
these disadvantages made it more likely that a foreign infringer rather
than a domestic infringer would be sued for patent infringement. 65
Canada believed these discriminatory consequences of Section 337
proved that the section operated as a "whole system of law for the
protection of United States industry from injurious import competi-
tion," rather than as a mechanism to secure the enforcement of United
States patent law, as claimed by the United States. 66
60 Id. This argument is more fully addressed at notes 148-164 infra and accom-
panying text.
61 Spring Assemblies II, supra note 14, at 112. One commentator noted that the
respondent suffers substantial harassment potential for the following reasons: (1)
Section 337 investigations can go forward without regard to any other provisions of
law; (2) the addition of the commission investigative attorney to Section 337 discovery
procedure makes complainant's action under the statute comparatively easier than
those in other forms; (3) Section 337 is a relatively little-known statute, especially to
foreign respondents. See Comment, Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade
Practices Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 4 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus.
234, 235 n. 2 (1982).
62 Spring Assemblies II, supra note 14, at 1.12. Canada noted that such duplicative
proceedings had also existed in antidumping and countervailing duty areas but had
changed in 1978 as a result of international disfavor at the multinational trade
negotiations. Id.
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The compatibility of Section 337 with the General Agreement pre-
sented an issue of first impression for the Panel. Before reaching a
decision regarding Section 337, the Panel termed the applicability of
an Article XX(d) exclusion a threshold question: if the exclusion
applied, any further examination of consistency between the exclusion
order and the General Agreement would not be required. 67 The Panel
deemed the exclusion order necessary to protect the patent holder's
rights under existing United States law and concluded that any remedy
from a civil court would be inadequate. 6 As Section 337 provided
the only effective remedy to secure compliance with United States
patent law, the Panel found the authorization of the exclusion order
"necessary" within Article XX(d) and therefore not incompatible with
the General Agreement. 69
This Panel decision, however, is of very suspect legal value. By
applying the "necessary" exception to the case, the Panel avoided
any review of the consistency of Section 337 to relevant provisions
of the Agreement. The Panel's action, therefore, precluded a direct
examination of the issues which led to the Canadian complaint. Nev-
ertheless, the Panel suggested the "strong possibility" that other Sec-
tion 337 investigations might violate the General Agreement and, by
way of observation, noted that its finding "carried no implication
that the use of Section 337 was an entirely satisfactory means of
dealing with patent-based cases." ' 70 Consequently, this failure to ad-
dress the specific dispute at issue or to provide any definitive guidance
on the subject caused many qualifications and reservations, rendering
the report essentially impotent. 7' As the pending aramids case before
67 Id. at 124.
61 Id. at 126.
69 Id.
70 Id at 127. The panel decision stated:
The Panel did not, therefore, exclude the strong possibility that there might
be cases, for example involving high-cost products of an advanced technical
nature and with a very limited number of potential users in the United
States, where a procedure before a United States court might provide the
patent holder with an equally satisfactory and effective remedy against
infringement of his patent rights. In such cases the use of an exclusion order
under Section 337 might not be necessary in terms of Article XX(d) to secure
compliance with laws and regulations (i.e. United States patent law) which
were not inconsistent with the General Agreement. If therefore Article XX(d)
were found not to be applicable, such use would be subject to the other
relevant provision of the General Agreement.
7, After the Panel report had been before the Council for several meetings with
no agreeable resolution the Council Chairman proposed to the Council:
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the Panel demonstrates, the Panel decision in Spring Assemblies re-
solved very little concerning Section 337.
III. THE AKZO/DuPoNTr TEST CASE
The Panel decision in Spring Assemblies noted that the substance
of patent infringement cases could vary considerably, and in some
factual circumstances an Article XX(d) exception would not be nec-
essary to secure compliance with United States law. 72 This suggestion
left foreign producers waiting for an appropriate case to test the
Panel's supposition. The European Community believes it has found
the appropriate test-case in RE: United States Litigation Between E.L
DuPont De Nemours & Co. and AKZO N. V.73
AKZO and DuPont have been involved in an ongoing dispute
involving the manufacture of aramid fibers74 since 1980. 75 The specific
That the Council take note of the statements made in the discussion over
the report of the Panel (L/5333), and adopt the report on the understanding
that this shall not foreclose future examination of the use of Section 337
to deal with patent infringement cases from the point of view of consistency
with Articles III and XXX of the General Agreement.
The Council agreed to the Chairman's proposal. Opposition, however, continued
despite this compromise. Brazil, for example, refused to join any consensus and
reserved its position entirely. According to the representative of Brazil:
the Council had failed to take up its responsibilities not only under Article
XXIII of the General Agreement, but also under the Tokyo Round under-
standing on dispute settlement (BISD 265/210), and under the 1982 Min-
isterial Decision on dispute settlement (L/5424, pages 6-8). The Panel report
had not ... addressed certain aspects of this case and therefore had not
provided sufficient advice for the Council either to make recommendations
or to give a ruling under Article XXIII:2.
GATT, Doc. C/M/168 (1983), at 10-11 (Document on file at the office of The
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law).
72 GATT Panel-Spring Assemblies, supra note 14, at 127.
71 Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 547.
14 Aramid fibers are the strongest commercial synthetic fibers known to man -
pound for pound about five times stronger than steel. AKZO N.V. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 80 F.2d 1471, 1475 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1986). AKZO's aramid is
registered under the trademark "Twaron" while DuPont's is registered under the
trademark "Kevlar."
7S AKZO and DuPont are the only manufacturers in the world with the capability
to produce these fibers commercially. Both AKZO and DuPont hold U.S. patents
covering manufacturing processes of the fibers and the fiber products (DuPont cur-
rently holds six patents while AKZO currently holds five). Since 1980, AKZO has
unsuccessfully sought a declaration by the United States courts that DuPont's patents
are invalid. In 1980, the United States District Court in Delaware (DuPont is registered
in Delaware) declined to adjudicate AKZO's claim because AKZO had failed to
present a real "case or controversy." As AKZO was only testing the U.S. market
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litigation which resulted in the present GATT panel investigation began
in April, 1984, when DuPont filed a complaint with the ITC alleging
patent infringement through unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts in the importation or sale of the aramids. 76 After an investigation
in which both parties participated, the ITC concluded that the im-
portation and sale of the fibers did constitute an unlawful act or
with aramid samples and possessed no existing commercial product plan, the court
felt there was no real issue to be litigated. See ENKA v. DuPont, 519 F. Supp. 356
(D. Del.8 1981).
In October, 1953, after AKZO had begun construction of a major manufacturing
facility in the Netherlands, AKZO again filed suit in Delaware seeking to have
DuPont's patents declared invalid. DuPont moved to dismiss AKZO's action, filed
a counterclaim alleging infringement of its patents, and initiated ITC proceedings on
its process patent, the proceeding which ultimately has become the subject of the
GATT panel investigation. The District Court dismissed AKZO's claims with regard
to DuPont's two process patents for lack of jurisdiction, declined to exercise juris-
diction on the product patents because of the parallel ITC proceeding, and dismissed
DuPont's counterclaim for improper service of process. AKZONA v. DuPont, 607
F. Supp. 227 (D. Del. 1984).
Lastly, in May 1985, AKZO filed suit in the United States District Court of Virginia
(DuPont manufactured Kelvar at its Spruance Plant in Richmond, Virginia) seeking
an injunction and damages for the deliberate infringement of another of its process
patents. DuPont counterclaimed that AKZO's patent was unenforceable in view of
prior arts and therefore could not be infringed. The District court held AKZO's
process patent invalid for obviousness. AKZO N.V. v. DuPont, 635 F. Supp. 1336
(E.D. Va. 1986). This decision was subsequently upheld on appeal. AKZO N.V. v.
DuPont, 810 F.2d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Recently completed or pending patent
litigation between AKZO and DuPont also exists in the Netherlands, Great Britain,
France, Germany and Japan. Complaint for ENKA B.V., Commission Decision,
supra note 10 [hereinafter AKZO Complaint].
76 Because this litigation involved a process patent the complaint was brought
under Section 337(a). That section provides:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee,
or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States,
are declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall
be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in
this section.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1985).
Foreign producers feel that Section 337(a) represents a substantive extension of
U.S. patent law which, because of difficulties for foreign producers in bringing claims
before the ITC, grants U.S. process patent holders a separate right unavailable to
foreign producers. AKZO Complaint, supra note 75 at 11-13.
The original complaint filed by DuPont named as respondents AKZO N.V., ENKA
B.V., and Aramide Maatschappij v.o.f., all of the Netherlands, and AKZONA Inc.
of Enka, North Carolina. AKZO N.V. v. USITC, 808 F.2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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method of competition in violation of Section 337.77 Finding the fibers
to be manufactured abroad by a process which, if practiced in the
United States, would have infringed a United States patent process
covered by the claims of United States Letters Patent No. 3,767,756
assigned to DuPont, the ITC determined a limited exclusion order to
be the appropriate remedy.7" Subsequently, on November 25, 1985,
the ITC issued an order excluding the importation into the United
States of certain aramid fibers made abroad by AKZO or its affiliated
companies .79
Two weeks after the issuance of the ITC order, AKZO lodged a
complaint with the Commission alleging that the application of Section
337 to AKZO's importation of the aramids and the resulting exclusion
order constituted an illicit commercial practice by the United States
Government which threatened injury to a Community industry. 0 Spe-
cifically, AKZO claimed that certain ITC procedures preventing res-
pondents from raising a counterclaim, considered by AKZO to be
essential to an effective defense, violated the national treatment pro-
vision of Article III of the General Agreement.8 ' AKZO also claimed
that this violation did not fall within the parameters of the general
exception provisions of Article XX.12 The Commission held the pro-
cedure followed by the ITC pursuant to Section 337 to be less favorable
to the respondents than the procedures in the United States district
courts, and determined that this practice thereby denied national
treatment as required by the General Agreement. 3 The Commission
then held the evidence of an illicit commercial practice and resultant
threat of injury sufficient to warrant initiation of GATT procedures
for consultation and dispute settlement. 84
11 USITC Pub. No. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194; 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1967, 1970
(1986).
71 Id. at 1969. United States Letters' Patent No. 3,767,756 (756 patent) is a process
patent. Claim 13 of the 756 patent co ,ers the process of producing aramid fiber on
a commercial basis. This was the only patent DuPont named in its complaint before
the ITC.
79 Id. at 1971-72. The limited exclusion order prohibited the entry of aramid fibers
in the form of fiber, yarn, pulp, staple, chopped fiber, paper, felt, or fabric. Other
commercial applications of these fibers include rope, tires, bulletproof clothing, and
in substitutes for steel, aluminum, asbestos, nylon, and cotton. Id.
Io Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 546.
S1 Id at 547.
82 Id. See supra note 48 for relevant exceptions.
83 Id. at 550.
4 Id. The procedure by which the Commission initiates consultation before a
GATT Panel is provided for under Article 6 of Council Regulation 2641/84.
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IV. Is SECTION 337 CONSISTENT WITH UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT?
The central theme of United States trading partners in their ob-
jections to Section 337 is that the statute and its exclusion order
remedy are not "necessary" within the meaning of the exception; and
even if, under some particular factual circumstance, they can be
considered necessary, the statute's administration is nevertheless in-
consistent with the national treatment provision of the Agreement. 5
Thus, United States trading partners claim the exception should never
be applicable since any application of Section 337 violates the Agree-
ment's broad prohibition against inferior treatment. In addressing
those contentions, any analysis of Section 337's compatibility with the
Agreement entails a two part approach: first, whether Section 337
provides less-than-national treatment, and second, whether the excep-
tion allows such treatment.
A. Does the administration of Section 337 provide less-than-
national treatment?
United States law provides for an infringement action against do-
mestic producers accused of infringing United States patents.8 6 With
regard to imported goods accused of infringing a United States patent,
a domestic patent holder has a choice: he may bring an infringement
action before a federal court, or seek an exclusion order pursuant to
Section 337. Foreign respondents to a Section 337 investigation argue
that subjection to separate procedures imposes upon them a greater
burden than does the single infringement procedure faced by a domestic
respondent. 7 According to the respondents, this problem is com-
pounded by the fact that they are not simply subject to either one
The E.C. Commission decision shall apply after a period of thirty days if the E.C.
Council does not act upon it. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Sept. 17,
1984, 27 O.J. EUR. Comm (No. L. 252) (1984). This new procedure has been called
the "New Trade Policy Instrument." See generally Bronckers, Private Response to
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices-United States and EEC Complaint Procedures, 6
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 651 (1984).
11 For a discussion of the prerequisites of an article XX(d) exception see GATT,
MDF/W/19, at 22 (Jan. 10, 1985). (GATT Secretariat's Preliminary Background
Note on Trade in Counterfeit Goods).
86 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1982).
87 See generally Spring Assemblies II, supra note 14 at 111-14.
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procedure or the other, but instead are often faced with both pro-
cedures simultaneously.88 Technically, without coming under an ex-
isting exception, this double jeopardy violates the national treatment
provision solely because foreign respondents face a proceeding which
domestic respondents do not.8 9
Proponents of Section 337 claim that Section 337 is necessary to
secure compliance with United States patent laws and other unfair
trade laws generally. 90 They correctly assert that national treatment
does not necessarily mean identical treatment, but rather that domestic
and foreign products need only be treated equally. 9' Therefore, they
argue, different or parallel measures may be used so long as they
have the same enforcement outcome. The proponents argue that Sec-
tion 337 provides a remedy for two specific problems which United
States federal courts cannot: service of process and enforcement of
judgments. 92 Valid service of process is necessary to proceed before
a federal court; however, such service on foreign respondents is es-
pecially expensive and time consuming and at times altogether im-
possible because regular service by mail is easily avoided by a simple
refusal to accept delivery. 93 The second problem concerns the en-
forcement of judgments against foreign defendants. The remedies
available in United States courts, injunction and damages, are only
enforceable within a courts particular jurisdiction and where the re-
spondent has sufficient assets in the United States to satisfy any
judgment. Because these remedies can only be enforced extraterrito-
rially through foreign courts they are at times wholly ineffective. 94
Section 337, by contrast, provides for in rem jurisdiction over unfair
imports. 95 The exclusion order remedy available under Section 337
88 This threat of facing simultaneous proceedings on essentially the same issues is
not theoretical. In refusing to enjoin a simultaneous ITC proceeding, the U.S. District
Court for Delaware stated, ". . . Congress, as the source of this court's patent
jurisdiction and the ITC's jurisdiction, has made the choice to permit an overlap of
issues in these two fora. It cannot, therefore, be said that the simultaneous prosecution
of an ITC action is an unlawful intrusion upon this courts patent jurisdiction." In
Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (D.C.
Del. 1985).
89 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
10 See generally, Spring Assemblies II, supra note 14, at 121.
9, Id. at 123.
92 Id. at 116-17.
93 Id. at 116.
9 Id. at 117.
- 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(e) & (0 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For full text, see supra
note 34.
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ensures the protection of domestic industry by stopping the unfair
import at the border. 96 Consequently, proponents argue that Section
337's jurisdiction and remedy are necessary to ensure the same level
of compliance as would be available in domestic courts.
Article III of the General Agreement operates to prevent the inferior
treatment of foreign goods. As previously noted, the treatment need
not be identical, only not less than that afforded goods of national
origin. The relevant inquiry then is whether these separate procedures
operate as the functional equivalent of the single procedure for accused
domestic infringers or whether the separate procedures present such
procedural inequities that they result in less-than-national treatment. 97
To answer this inquiry, the perceived major disadvantages of the
separate Section 337 procedure must be examined.
1. The strict and arbitrary time constraints do not allow for a
full and fair adjudication.
A Section 337 investigation operates under strict time constraints.
Though trial-like in that it includes extensive discovery, motions, party
conferences, and hearings, the investigation must be concluded and
the ITC must reach a final determination within twelve months (within
eighteen months if a case is deemed more complicated). 98 Within this
period, stringent intermediate deadlines are imposed by code for the
respondent's response to service" (20 days from the date of service)
and to all responses to requests for interrogatories, admissions, and
production of documents'00 (within 10 days of service of request). The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sets all other deadlines for particular
96 Exclusion orders are enforced by the U.S. Customs Service. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(d) (1982).
97 On appeal from the ITC determination in Aramid Fiber, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) framed the appropriate inquiry as whether AKZO
was afforded the same rights afforded to domestic firms in a Section 337 proceeding
before the ITC. AKZO N.V. v. USITC, 808 F.2d 1471, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This
is incorrect. The appropriate inquiry concerning Article III national treatment is
whether, in patent proceedings, those who deal in foreign goods are afforded the
same treatment as those who deal in domestic goods. As domestic patent proceedings
take place in U.S. district court and patent proceedings involving foreign goods mostly
occur at the ITC, the appropriate comparison concerns U.S. district court proceedings
and Section 337 ITC proceedings.
9- 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
19 C.F.R. § 210.21 (1987).
19 C.F.R. §§ 210.32-34 (1987).
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stages' 0' and all stages must be conducted consistent with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 10 2 Failure to comply with any of these
deadlines subjects the failing party to stiff sanctions. 03
Within this framework, the procedural history of the aramids case
before the ITC evidences the inferior treatment afforded AKZO due
to these time constraints. The ITC ordered investigation of an alleged
Section 337 violation of May 14, 1984. 104 Upon service, AKZO had
twenty days not only to respond to DuPont's complaint and notice
but to answer requests for interrogatories and documents as well. 05
This stringent regimen carried over into pretrial preparation as the
ALJ set a discovery cut-off date for Oct. 26, 1984 and a December
3, 1984, evidentiary hearing date. °6 Due to the number and complexity
of the issues required to be adjudicated, AKZO motioned for an
additional four months in which to prepare. The ITC finally acted
on this motion seven working days prior to the start of the originally-
scheduled hearing and then granted only a ten-week extension.3 7
During this discovery period an incredibly large volume of discovery
was sought and elicited, including over a half-million pages of doc-
uments. 10
The evidentiary hearing on violation took place between February
11 and February 23, 1985 with additional rebuttal testimony heard
o, 19 C.F.R. § 210.7 (1987).
1-2 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) requires that: "Each determination
under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on the record after notice
and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the provisions of subchapter II of
chapter 5 of title 5." The APA may be found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
103 These sanctions include adverse inferences, the preclusion of supporting evidence,
and an adverse determination against the party. 19 C.F.R. 210.36; see Certain
Multicellular Plastic Film, USITC Pub. No. 987, Inv. No. 337-TA-54 (June, 1979).
(A respondent who did not comply with a discovery order was sanctioned by an
adverse inference which ultimately lead to an exclusion order against its products).
04 In Re Certain Aramid Fiber, USITC Pub. No. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194; 8
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1967, 1968 (1986).
1o ENKA's Brief in Response to Comments of the U.S. Government and Obser-
vations of DuPont at 22, Re United States Litigation between E.I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co. and AKZO N.V., O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 117/18) (12 March, 1987), 2
COMMON MKT L. R. 545 (1987) [hereinafter AKZO Response Brie]. (Non-confidential
version on file in the offices of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law.)
106 Id.
-o Id. at 22-23. The ITC acted on AKZO's motion on Nov. 19, 1984. Id.
10, Id. at 23. In addition, over one hundred depositions were taken and approxi-
mately six hundred interrogatories and requests for admissions were served. Id.
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on February 28 and March 5, 198 5 .09 During these fourteen days the
hearings regularly lasted twelve-to-fourteen hours daily including Sa-
turdays with little break, 10 a pace which made proper witness and
trial preparation virtually impossible. The ALJ issued an Initial De-
termination on May 9, and after partial review, the ITC, on November
25, 1985, affirmed a limited exclusion order."' Although, the entire
proceeding before the ITC involving complex patent, anti-trust, and
economic issues lasted almost eighteen months, all investigation, prep-
aration, and evidentiary hearings took place in the first ten months.
The harshness of these time constraints becomes clearer when com-
pared with the more equitable procedural treatment provided by the
federal courts. Paula Stern, former Chairwoman of the ITC, testified
before a House subcommittee that "only half the patent-based trials
in federal district courts are completed within 29 months.' 1 2 In con-
trast, the ITC constraints hardly seem reasonable or to provide equal
treatment. Chairwoman Stern added, "[tihis time differential for ad-
judication is significant and may provide tactical advantages that could
translate into abridgement of rights.""' 3 Her testimony refers to the
lengthy court proceedings failing to remedy situations quickly enough,
but as the AKZO case shows, the reverse may also be true. Unnec-
essarily short time limits can prevent respondents from obtaining a
full and fair adjudication of the issues. The addition of a third party
to the litigation, the ITC investigative attorney, can only further
,o Certain Aramid Fiber, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1968 (March, 1986).
1o AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 23.
"I Certain Aramid Fiber, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1968-72 (March, 1986). On June 3,
AKZO requested ITC review of the ALJ's initial determination. AKZO Complaint,
supra note 75 at 28. The standards for granting review of an initial determination
include:
(A) A finding or conclusion of material fact is clearly erroneous;
(B) A legal conclusion is erroneous, without governing precedent, rule or
law, or constitutes an abuse of discretion; or
(C) The determination is one affecting Commission policy.
19 C.F.R. § 210.54(a)(1)(ii). The ITC chose only to review the ALJ's conclusion that
claim 13 of the 756 patent was not invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Certain
Aramid Fiber, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969 (March, 1986) 1969. The ITC may initiate its
own review but this is rarely done. For a case in which the ITC initiated review, see
Certain Caulking Guns, USITC Pub. No. 1507, Inv. No. 337-TA-139 (1984).
112 See Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 20 (1986) (statement of Dr. Paula
Stern, Chairwoman U.S. International Trade Commission) [hereinafter Stern State-
ment].
13 Id. at 20-21.
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aggravate these constraints."14 Clearly, this disparate treatment may
amount to less-than national treatment.
2. The extensive use or overuse of the protective order violates
rights of due process.
In Section 337 proceedings, a general protective order enables either
party to initially designate information as confidential, thus avoiding
extensive disclosure during discovery." 5 This designation restricts dis-
closure of information to the opponent's outside counsel, experts, and
those who can make the requisite showing of need."l6 This initial
designation, however, is not conclusive. Upon objection by a party,
procedures within the protective order itself will typically allow for
voluntary resolution by the parties; failing that, either party could
submit its objection to the ALJ or the ITC for final resolution." 7
The protective order plays an important role in Section 337 inves-
tigations since the strict time constraints force the ITC to be heavily
dependent on the parties' voluntary participation in discovery." I8 Only
through complete participation by the parties will the ITC be able to
carry out its specific tasks; any unnecessary disclosure of sensitive
information would undoubtedly affect the parties' willingness to par-
ticipate." 9 The ITC in Rotary Wheel Printers noted that "protection
of confidential information is crucial to the Commission's ability to
carry out its statutory responsibilities."' 2° Hence, the ITC has taken
11 19 C.F.R. § 210.14(b) (1986). For a description of the participation of the staff
attorney see McDermid, The Trade Act of 1974: Section 337 of the Tariff Act and
the Public Interest, 11 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 421, 453-464 (1978).
.15 19 C.F.R. § 210.37 (1987).
116 In Re Certain Rotary Wheel Printers, Inv. No. 337-TA-145, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1933, 1937 (November, 1983). Commission rules do not specifically address the release
of confidential information. Commission practice, however, is that the party seeking
access must show that it has no other reasonable way of adequately preparing and
presenting its arguments without the information. Id.
-,7 An example of this typical provision is paragraph 10 of the protective order
issued by the ALJ in the aramids case. This paragraph provides a mechanism whereby
the objecting party "shall confer [with the supplier] as to the status of the subject
information proffered within the context of this order" and if within 10 days this
voluntary resolution failed, either party could submit the issue to the ALJ or the
Commission. This mechanism could also be used to permit disclosure of classified
material to other persons. AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at
1483 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
"I8 Rotary Wheel Printers, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1935.
119 AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1483.
,20 Rotary Wheel Printers, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1935.
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the stance that "in Section 337 investigations, it is the exception rather
than the rule to release confidential information to in-house coun-
sel." 121 Many respondents in Section 337 actions claim that the overuse
of the protective order violates principles of fundamental due process
by depriving a party of its rights to confrontation, to rebuttal, and
to effective assistance of counsel' .122
Due process principles are incorporated into administrative agency
proceedings, including those of the ITC, by the APA.' 23 The Act
accords parties the right "to appear in person or by or with counsel
or other duly qualified representative in an agency proceeding."' ' 24
These rights, however, must be qualified by the nature of the ad-
ministrative proceeding and that proceeding's needs to perform its
prescribed task.' 25 Thus, a party's rights to participation and access
to confidential information must be balanced by the ITC's need to
protect confidentiality. To determine whether, to whom, and under
what conditions to release confidential information, the ITC conducts
a balancing test, weighing the parties need to the information against
the harm that information would cause the supplier, as well as the
forum's interest in maintaining confidentiality. 126
AKZO advanced this due process argument on appeal of the Ar-
amids case to the CAFC. Claiming that the protective order protected
80° 0 of the documents and testimony submitted by DuPont, AKZO
asserted that its inability to review these documents resulted in AKZO
being unable to assist its outside counsel in the preparation and
litigation of its case. 127 AKZO argued the protective order severely
hindered its defense because, when combined with the severe time
constraints, AKZO had virtually no time to acquaint its counsel with
its own products, production processes, or marketing efforts. 21 AKZO
considered the order especially prejudicial because as DuPont and
121. Id.
122 See, e.g., AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1482 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
23 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
124 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
' AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1484.
126 Rotary Wheel Printer, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1937.
127 AKZO Complaint, supra note 75 at 32. DuPont rebutted this computation by
explaining that AKZO categorized as "confidential" every document on which any
confidential material was found. DuPont added that, on this basis, 78% of AKZO's
documents were confidential. Brief by intervenor-Appellee at 45, n. 46, AKZO N.V.
v. U.S. Int'l. Trade Comm'n 808 F.2d at 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
128 AKZO Complaint, supra note 75 at 32.
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AKZO were the only manufacturers of the aramids, there existed no
outside experts on the technology and marketing aspects of the fibers. 129
Relying predominantly on Rotary Wheel Printers the CAFC found
no violation of AKZO's due process rights. 30 Noting that AKZO had
more than 90 representatives-including technical experts and four
large law firms with unrestricted access to DuPont's confidential
information-and that AKZO never invoked its dispute resolution
procedures to challenge DuPont's confidential designation, the CAFC
determined that AKZO failed to demonstrate that the protective order
caused them actual harm.'
Based on AKZO's failure to present any evidence of need for access,
and DuPont's unchallenged assertion of a need to protect its confi-
dentiality, the CAFC's decision seems correct.' 2 The CAFC, however,
failed to address the important question under a national treatment
analysis: whether the different standards of the ITC and the federal
courts governing what constitutes confidential information provides
inferior treatment.' The CAFC did not examine this issue because
11 AKZO Complaint Brief, supra note 105 at 27.
130 AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1483-85.
131 Id. at 1484-85.
13 "Without evidence of need for the access, there is nothing to weigh against the
interests in maintaining confidentiality" Rotary Wheel Printers 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at
1937, citing Roses, Inc. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 116, 117, 2 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1548,1549 (1980).
133 Before the Commission, AKZO argued that although the ITC rule was modeled
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the ITC interprets it very differently. AKZO
Response Brief, supra note 105, at 27. Rule 26(c) provides:
(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a dep-
osition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, in-
cluding one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions,
including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be
had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party
seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6)
that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com-
mercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or infor-
mation enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may,
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of a number of decisions upholding confidentiality which "strongly
suggest the validity of carefully tailored protective orders allowing
exceptions to be made if adequate proof is made."'13 4 This finding,
however, provides no guidance with regard to the question of national
treatment. Where a difference in standards and application of pro-
tective orders exists, there also exists a very real possibility of inferior
treatment.
3. Respondent may not have all related claims settled in one
proceeding.
As a rule, the ITC will only examine those claims set forth in the
complaint because every element of each independently-asserted claim
must be proven in order to warrant a remedy.'35 Although there exists
no regulatory prohibition preventing the ITC from entertaining related
claims, even compulsory counterclaims, in practice the ITC refuses
to do so. While such a practice is seemingly justified by the strict
time constraints imposed on the ITC process, the practice of the ITC
is in stark contrast to the practice of federal courts. Rule 18 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third party claim, may join, either as independent or
as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime,
as he has against an opposing party. 136
United States courts typically allow these claims primarily on the basis
of judicial economy - hearing related issues with the same parties
at the same time.1 7 Although the rules governing Section 337 state
on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
114 AKZO N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1485.
135 In her testimony before the House Subcommittee, Former Chairwoman Stern
acknowledged: "the ITC does not consider counterclaims, contrary to the judicial
principle of resolving all disputes between the parties at one time in one forum."
Stern Statement, supra note 112, at 20. For a summary of the elements needed to
warrant a remedy, see supra note 39.
136 FED. R. Civ. P. 18a.
'3' See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d.
Cir. 1961) ("where multiple claims involve many of the same factual issues, or the
same factual and legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties, fairness and considerations of convenience and of economy
require that the counterclaimant be permitted to maintain his cause of action.")
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that all legal and equitable defenses are available,13 no ITC equivalent
of the notion of judicial economy appears to exist.
The ITC investigation of Certain Aramid Fibers evidences the prej-
udice that this differential treatment may create. As noted previously,
DuPont and AKZO are the only companies with the capability of
manufacturing the fibers on a commercial basis. At the time of
investigation DuPont held two patents covering its manufacturing
processes and four patents covering its fiber products while AKZO
held three process and three product patents. 19 The Section 337 in-
vestigation began when DuPont alleged that AKZO imported products
into the United States made overseas by a process which, if practiced
in the United States, would have been prohibited by DuPont's rights
under one of its process patents.14 0
At hearing, AKZO sought to counterclaim that DuPont's technique
in the manufacture of its aramid products infringed one of AKZO's
process patents.1 4' Essentially, AKZO claimed that if both its process
patent and DuPont's process patent were valid and both were infringed
then DuPont could not continue its manufacture of the aramids
because AKZO's patented process would act as a blocking patent-
it covered a prior process used in conjunction with the other patents
to produce the fiber commercially. 42 Consequently, if DuPont could
not produce its fiber commercially, it could not prove the existence
of an efficient and economically-operated domestic industry and could
.3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). See supra note 33 for the text of this section.
139 AKZO Complaint, supra note 75 Attachment A pp. 2-5. DuPont holds its
process patents under U.S. Letters No. 3, 787, 756 (756 patent) and No. 30.352
(intermediate product), and its product patents under U.S. Letter numbers 3,817,941;
3,819,587; 3,869,429; 3,869,430.
AKZO holds process patents under U.S. Letters numbers 4,376,730; 4,308,374 (the
374 patent); and 4,320,081, and its product patents under U.S. Letters numbers
4,368,615; 4,455,341; 547,491 (application sn).
,40 Certain Aramid Fibers, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1968.
141 AKZO Complaint, supra note 75 at 34.
142 AKZO's 374 process patent covered a polymerization process utilizing a N-
Methylpyrolidone and calcium chloride (NMP/CaCI = 2 =) solvent system. This solvent
system is attractive because it is a noncarcinogenic. DuPont originally used a solvent
containing hexamethylphosphoramide ("HMPA") which was found to be an exper-
imental carcinogen. In 1982, DuPont began using the NMP/CaCI = 2 solvent which
it had previously developed independent of AKZO but which would have been covered
by AKZO's 374 patent. AKZO argued that if allowed to counterclaim against this
infringement, DuPont's 756 patent would be blocked as AKZO's NMP/CaCl = 2
solvent was a process required by DuPont's process. See AKZO N.V. v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours, 635 F. Supp. 1336-48.
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not meet the requirements for the exclusion order remedy. 41 The
ITC's refusal to hear AKZO's counterclaim, resulted in AKZO's
subsequent exclusion from the United States market since the ITC
examined only DuPont's process patent.
The potential prejudice which could result from the failure to allow
respondents to counterclaim seems obvious. In all probability, a federal
district court would have heard AKZO's counterclaim and any other
claims related to the aramids, including those concerning other pat-
ents.' 44 In contrast, the ITC procedures potentially allow a party to
manipulate an entire case by confining the ITC's examination to one
particular matter. In Aramid Fibers, DuPont astutely chose a single
patent (of its six), confined the examination to that patent, proved
infringment, and consequently received the draconian exclusion order
remedy. 145
AKZO's inability to get the entire dispute heard in a single forum
necessitated the filing of a patent infringement suit in federal court
seeking to enjoin DuPont from infringing its patents. 146 In this suit,
DuPont counterclaimed against AKZO's process patent and eventually
succeeded in having it declared invalid. 147 Regardless of this decision,
however, the single most important factor is AKZO's inability to have
its claims decided in a single forum under the same rules and pro-
cedures to which a domestic respondent would have been entitled.
Had AKZO been a domestic resondent before a federal court, the
validity of DuPont's patents would have been put in issue and AKZO
would not have been forced into the harassment, danger, and expense
of two forums to protect itself. The quick decisions accomplished by
adherence to Section 337's time constraints cannot justify the inferior
treatment possible under these separate and manipulatible procedures.
4. Federal court deference to the ITC allows the ITC to assume
a dominant position.
United States district courts and the ITC, under Section 337, share
concurrent jurisdiction over patent disputes involving foreign com-
141 AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 31.
" See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
14 DuPont claims that the case was brought under Section 337a because that section
specifically affords the protections of Section 337 to U.S. process patentholders against
imports. DuPont adds that holders of U.S. process patents have no other remedy
under U.S. law against infringing imports. DuPont Brief for Intevenor-Appellee at
61-62, n. 74.
141 AKZO N.V. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 635 F. Supp. at 1336.
147 Id. at 1356.
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panies. 14 This concurrent jurisdiction and the problems inherent therein
result from the 1974 amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930.149 By
imposing the requirements of the APA on Section 337 investigations,
the 1974 amendments created an adjudicatory, trial-like proceeding
in the ITC designed to reach a final determination regarding the claim
and implement a remedy. 150 The availability of two fora capable of
considering similar issues creates inherent difficulties. Allowing parties
before the ITC to later relitigate the same dispute before federal courts
undermines the legitimacy of the ITC proceeding.' If on the other
hand ITC decisions are afforded res judicata effect by federal courts,
complainants would seek its fast-track remedy, thus rendering federal
court jurisdiction pointless. As one commentator recently observed,
because the procedures and remedies of the two fora differ signifi-
cantly, one's choice of forum may have considerable influence on the
outcome of the dispute. 15 2
The problems for national treatment created by this concurrent
jurisdiction emanate from two realities: the procedural discrepancies
between the fora, and the recent development of the federal courts
to defer to the ITC in unfair trade cases.' 53 This development appears
logical; if concurrent proceedings are brought before both the ITC
and a federal court, the ITC proceeding, because of its time con-
straints, will be the first to render judgment. The time differential,
and the fact that in patent cases both the federal courts and the ITC
are reviewed by the CAFC, 5 4 produces a danger that district courts
48 Technically the two proceedings rest on different jurisdictional foundations.
Congress placed original jurisdiction over patent actions, i.e., patent validity and
enforceability, in the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Jurisdiction over
unfair import practices was placed in the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). Due to the
similarity of issues, however, the jurisdictions of these fora often overlap. For a
recent article discussing concurrent jurisdiction and suggesting how jurisdictional
conflicts might better be resolved, see Finalyson, Rethinking the Overlapping Juris-
diction of Section 337 and the U.S. Courts, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 41 (1987).
-, See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
150 Id.
- See Union Manufacturing Co. v. Han Back Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1985).
112 See Finalyson, supra note 148 at 41.
"I Id. at 58. The legislative history of the 1974 Act suggests that "suspension of
proceedings may be undertaken by the Commission, as an exercise of its own dis-
cretion, or as a result of a court order to the same effect." S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7326,
7327 (1985). In practice, however, the ITC rarely suspends its investigations irrespective
of other proceedings. See Finalyson, supra note 148, at 55-58.
114 See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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may consider it futile to proceed in such cases. Such deference in
unfair trade cases results in the ITC assuming a dominant position
on issues common to both fora, and consequently the application of
its unique practice and procedures to those cases.
Despite language in the legislative history of the 1974 Act expressly
precluding a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of ITC decisions
in patent cases, 55 as a practical matter these decisions may still obtain
such force. For example, during the ITC investigation of aramid fibers
AKZO brought an action for declaratory judgment in federal court
seeking to have all six of DuPont's aramid patents declared invalid,
unenforceable, and noninfringed.156 DuPont admitted jurisdiction over
the four product patents but contended that the court had no juris-
diction over the two process patents.1 7 The court, concluding that
DuPont could not litigate an infringement suit based on its two process
patents in a district court, found no jurisdictional basis for AKZO's
declaratory judgment suit on the same issues. 5 ' The court also declined
-to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the case because it found Congress
provided a specific forum - the ITC - for the protection of those
interests regarding imports. 159 The court added that even if it had
jurisdiction or could assume pendant jurisdiction, it would decline
jurisdiction because of the pending matter before the ITC, whose
adjudication "could very well resolve the issues presented in this
case. " 160
Apart from any possible res judicata effects in lower court pro-
ceedings, the differing standards of review utilized by the CAFC upon
appellate review of patent cases poses a threat to national treatment
of foreign litigants. Pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, the CAFC possesses appellate review of both federal courts
and the ITC.16 1 District Court decisions of factual determinations are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 62 The CAFC, on the
133 The legislative history specifically states that "decisions by the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals reviewing Commission decisions under section 337 should
not serve as res judicata or collateral estoppel in matters where U.S. District Courts
have original jurisdiction." Finance Comm. Rep., supra note 27, at 7212.
136 AKZONO Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227 (D.C.
Del. 1984).
117 Id. at 229.
" Id. at 231.
159 Id.
l60 Id. at 232.
161 See supra note 38.
162 FED. R. CIv. P. 52.
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other hand, will uphold ITC factual determinations where substantial
evidence exists on the record. 63 This disparity subjects foreign prod-
ucers to a double curse; not only are foreign infringers subject to the
more deferential review standard given ITC decisions on appeal, but
foreign complainants are forced to litigate their claims in district courts
and meet the higher standard of review while their domestic coun-
terparts may utilize the ITC.' 64 Clearly this disparity is a double
standard operating for the benefit of domestic producers.
B. Is Section 337 a "necessary" exception to the principles of the
General Agreement within the sense of Article XX(d)?
Article XX(d) of the General Agreement provides an exception from
GATT obligations for the adoption or enforcement of measures that
are necessary to secure compliance with national laws or regulations
concerning the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices.' 65 Proponents of Section 337 label
the section a trade remedy statute operating against unfair imports
which, because of certain difficulties existing under United States law,
necessarily exist to secure compliance with United States patent laws.m66
In other words, Section 337 is necessary because, in circumstances
involving foreign infringers, it possesses the only effective remedy -
the general exclusion order.
The GATT Panel in Spring Assemblies accepted this view of Section
337 on the specific facts of that case. Considering the potential conflict
of this statute with GATT principles, the Panel noted that:
the GATT recognized, by the very existence of Article XX(d), the
need to provide that certain measures taken by a contracting party
to secure compliance with its national laws or regulations which
otherwise would not be in conformity with the GATT obligations
163 See SSIH Equipment, S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 745 F.2d
1 (Fed. cir. 1984).
164 As a practical matter most foreign patent owners can not bring a claim before
the ITC because they cannot establish the existence of a domestic industry. See supra
note 39. The importance of this standard of review is illustrated by statistics which
show that since the 1974 amendments, holders of United States patents have prevailed
on the issue of patent validity in about 65% of the ITC decisions, whereas United
States patent holders prevail on patent validity only 40-45% in United States district
courts. In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser, 7 ITRD 1208, n. 11 (D. Del. 1985).
161 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
' See Stern Statement, supra note 112, at 21-23.
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of that contracting party would, through the application of this
provision under the conditions stipulated therein, be in conformity
with the GATT provided that the national laws or regulations con-
cerned were not inconsistent with the General Agreement. 167
Interpreting the term "measure" found in Article XX(d) as meaning
the exclusion order, 161 the Panel considered the necessity of the ex-
clusion order to secure compliance with United States patent law.
Based on the particular factual circumstances of Spring Assemblies,
the Panel concluded that no effective and satisfactory alternative
existed in the federal courts and thus action under Section 337 was
necessary, thereby falling within the GATT exception. 169 The Panel
allowed, however, for the "strong possibility" that under different
factual circumstances federal court might render an equally effective
remedy. 170 In such a case, Section 337 would be unnecessary and
inconsistent with Article XX(d).
The Panel posited a set of circumstances where Section 337 might
be unnecessary which involved a high-cost product of an advanced
technical nature with a very limited number of potential users.' 7' The
rationale of this example concerns a federal court's ability to render
an effective remedy in lieu of an ITC exclusion order. While the
aramid products may not fit this particular loophole, the rationale
may still apply to the aramids circumstance. Aramids are products
of an advanced technical nature with an extraordinarily wide range
of uses and, hence, potential users. 72 For remedy purposes, however,
the determinative fact may be that AKZO and DuPont are the only
producers with the capability of producing a commercially feasible
aramid product. As no other producers are likely to enter the market,
the importance of the United States market virtually assures AKZO's
presence in the United States for jurisdictional or enforcement pur-
poses, thus making them subject to the federal courts. 73 As the normal
hardships in dealing with foreign parties (the basis for Section 337
application) do not apply, Section 337 would be unnecessary in this
case.
167 Spring Assemblies II, at 124-25.
-6 Id. at 125.
169 Id. at 126.
170 Id. at 127.
171 Id.
172 See supra note 77.
"I The United States market is currently the largest and technologically most
advanced market for the aramids. See AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 54.
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Though this case-by-case factual application seems straightforward,
the aramid fibers case contains an extra twist. Due to a quirk in
United States law, process patent claims may not be brought in federal
court.'7 4 Relying on this anomaly, DuPont asserted that the ITC was
the only forum which could entertain DuPont's patent process claim
and therefore the Section 337 investigation and exclusion remedy
automatically became "necessary." 75 Under existing United States law,
this procedural posture forced by DuPont is technically valid. This
quirk, however, should not be allowed to conceal the important issue
relating to Section 337 - its inequitable administration.
A second approach concerning the question of necessity involves
the definition of the term "measure." Focusing on the necessity of
the available remedy, the Panel in Spring Assemblies defined measure
to mean the exclusion order issued by the ITC.176 An alternative would
be to define measure more broadly to include the entire Section 337
investigation. Consistent with the United States reference to the use
of Section 337 in patent infringement cases as the "enforcement
mechanism,"'' 77 this redefinition would render the statute unnecessary
where its procedures needlessly deny national treatment to foreign
respondents.
Similar to this approach, AKZO argued before the Commission
that even were the exclusion order necessary, that alone did not justify
the Article XX(d) exception. 17 The exception provides that the meas-
ures used by a party must be "necessary to secure compliance with
the laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Agreement." 79 Thus, if the laws underlying the measure violate
a provision of the Agreement (i.e., the national treatment provision),
then the exception won't apply. Perhaps because it invoked the GATT
174 Several recent bills have unsuccessfully sought to amend the patent statute to
enable United States process patent owners to obtain relief in federal court against
importation of products made overseas by means of a United States patented process.
See e.g., H.R. 1069, 99th Cong., 1st Sess (1985) and H.R. 3776, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
7I See Complainant's Reply Concerning Public Interest Issues and Remedy, In the
Matter of Certain Aramid Fibers, Inv. No. 337-TA-194, at 31 (Aug. 14, 1985). (Public
version on file at the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law.)
176 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
177 See Spring Assemblies II, at 114-15. The representative of the United States
stated, "Section 337 was not there to protect United States industry; its use in patent
infringement cases in fact only an enforcement mechanism to protect the rights of
United States patent holders." Id.
178 See AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 10.
,19 See supra note 48 (emphasis added).
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procedures, the Commission chose not to address this specific argu-
ment in its opinion except to add that the "Section 337 procedure is
not necessary in the sense that, as the practice in practically all other
countries shows, infringements of domestic patents by imports can be
dealt with in the same way as infringements by domestic products."' 80
A third, often-repeated argument against the necessity of separate
procedures for imports concerns the extra requirements required for
remedy in Section 337 investigations. 18' United States patent holders
have a right to an effective remedy against infringement based solely
upon ownership of their property right.' 82 If, however, the separate
procedures seek only the same level of compliance, then why must a
patent holder prove extra requirements, i.e., domestic industry and
injury, in order to secure a remedy against a foreign infringer under
Section 337? If the separate procedure is necessary, the ownership of
the property right itself should be sufficient.' 3 In reality the extra
requirements make Section 337 operate as a trade remedy statute and
not solely to protect property rights.184
Even though the stated purpose of this separate procedure may be
a trade remedy, this doesn't justify subjecting a foreign infringer to
two procedures. Article XX(d) allows an exception to the general
provisions of the Agreement for measures necessary to secure com-
pliance with laws or regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the
Agreement.8 5 Nothing in United States law prohibits Congress from
expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts to include in specific
cases the allowance of in rem remedies.8 6 As a result, no necessity
or justification exists for subjecting foreign infringers to two proce-
dures while domestic infringers are subject to only one. Since the
exception provision does not apply, an examination of the consistency
of Section 337 with the relevant GATT provisions is required. 8 7
110 Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 549.
" For the requirements to obtain remedy in a section 337 proceeding, see supra
note 39.
182 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1982).
283 For an opinion that this argument is in reality a red herring, see Intellectual
Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 179, 189-90 (1986) (Testimony of Robert Hudec,
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School).
184 See Stern Statement, supra note 112, at 23-25.
285 For text of Article XX(d) see supra note 48.
8 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
287 See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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V. COMMENTS
The legal issues surrounding Section 337 are extremely complex.
Not only do they involve a less-than-well-defined international obli-
gation affecting both United States domestic law and foreign policy,
they also affect the role of United States administrative agencies, legal
authorities peculiar to the United States legal system. Due to this
complexity, it is likely that no real black and white solutions exist to
the problems concerning Section 337 administration; perhaps the best
response can only be to fashion some better shade of gray. With this
in mind, the first step necessary to improve Section 337, or to better
bring it in line with United States international obligations, concerns
the initiation of a working dialogue between the policy makers and
other interested parties to explore existing alternatives.
As a practical matter, however, this dialogue will fall prey to the
law of inertia if left solely to the policy makers. Only through in-
ternational pressure will the United States ultimately decide that United
States interests require change in the existing procedures. Hence, the
Panel in Aramid Fibers occupies a very important and opportune
position. By rendering a decision directly on the Section 337 issues,
the Panel could offer true definitive guidance regarding the consistency
of Section 337 with United States GATT obligations. By so doing,
the Panel could signal its dissatisfaction with the existing structure
and begin to exert the pressure needed to initiate such a dialogue.
Many of the issues to be faced by the Aramid Fibers Panel will
duplicate those presented in Spring Assemblies.'88 As in Spring As-
semblies, before the Panel will examine the consistency of Section 337
with the general principles of the Agreement, it must find that the
exception provision of Article XX(d) does not apply.18 9 At this stage,
proponents of Section 337 will contend that because the aramids case
involved a process patent, the ITC was necessary as it provided the
only available forum.' 90 Understandably, the Panel may be reluctant
to examine the domestic legal procedures of a contracting party, but
it must not be persuaded by this contention. At issue is not the quirk
in United States law excluding process patents from district courts
but rather a much broader and more important issue affecting trans-
"' See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 48.
190 See supra note 175.
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national trade, the administration of Section 337.191 A definitive ruling
on this issue could help dispel many of the doubts concerning the
current viability and effectiveness of the GATT's dispute settlement
process. 192
Aside from the GATT's interest in offering some definitive guidance
on the use of Section 337, the United States also has an interest in
resolving this controversy. During the recent debates over Section 337
reform, practitioners argued against the removal of the industry and
injury requirements. 193 Essentially, they considered the existing pro-
cedure very effective in defending United States interests and worried
that such reform would precipitate numerous international challenges
and cause relief to become much less predictable. 194 Many feared that
this reform would cause Section 337 to be interjected into the upcoming
multilateral trade negotiations at the expense of other United States
interests and goals. 195 For reasons other than this reform, these fears
are likely to be substantiated. The increasing international disfavor
of Section 337 should already render it a topic of discussion and an
important defensive mechanism for United States trading partners. 196
If the United States wishes attention to focus on other intellectual
property issues, such as the conclusion of an anticounterfeiting code,
the United States must take action on Section 337 beforehand.
Despite the complexity of the Section 337 controversy and the fact
that any dialogue must entail extensive research and debate, several
options exist to better ensure national treatment of foreign litigants.
Perhaps the most obvious option would be to transfer the remedial
powers of Section 337 to the federal district courts. This option would
entail congressional action awarding district courts in rem jurisdiction
in patent infringement actions to be used when necessary to secure
19, AKZO has requested the European Community to retaliate by imposing its own
trade restrictions should resort to the GATT dispute resolution mechanism fail. See
AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 58-61.
292 For a critical analysis of the Panel procedure, see Note, An Unofficial Description
of How a GA TT Panel Works and Does Not, Swiss REv. OF INT'L COMPETITION L.
(Feb. 1987).
293 See statement of David Foster, Esq. on behalf of the International Trade
Commission Trial Lawyers Association, Testimony Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986).
194 Id.
195 Id.
,96 See supra note 71. Within the European Community written submissions from
numerous industry associations encouraged commission action on the Aramids case.
See AKZO Response Brief, supra note 105, at 57-58.
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compliance with United States patent laws. Although there exists no
constitutional impediment to create this jurisdiction, this option is not
without problems. One of the major reasons for the revitalization of
Section 337 concerned the amount of time it took district courts to
reach a judgment. If jurisdiction were returned to the courts un-
changed, the ITC's time constraints would pose serious due process
problems. In addition, in areas of assessment of industries and the
effects of imports on their competitiveness, the ITC possesses a rec-
ognized expertise which may suffer in the federal courts. Further,
placing this jurisdiction in the federal courts would entail the executive
giving up its presidential override powers. This could pose a danger
of the courts rendering decisions concerning particular parties which
could have considerable affects on United States foreign policy.
A recent commentary concerning the overlapping jurisdiction of
Section 337 and the United States courts presents a second option.' 97
The commentator suggests the creation of a mechanism to match and
allocate a particular dispute to the forum whose attributes are best
suited to decide the issues presented.198 Although this proposal focuses
on the unfairness and wastefulness of the present allocation system
(essentially forum shopping), it can also be relevant as an option to
promote national treatment. National treatment could be better ap-
proximated by the creation of a mechanism to match the particular
characteristics of a case to the forum best suited to resolve its problems
and by subjecting all respondents, foreign and domestic, to the same
mechanism. The determination of such a forum, however, must then
constitute a final adjudication. This approach would solve the prob-
lems of double jeopardy but could still pose a danger, depending on
the mechanism, of matching the majority of foreign respondents with
the ITC. Those subjected to the ITC would still face the procedural
inequities of that body.
A third option would be the creation of a distinct patent court.
Appellate review for patent cases has already been consolidated in
the CAFC. 99 so why not create a separate trial court with exclusive
patent jurisdiction? This court could be vested with in rem jurisdiction
and in time would attain the expertise of the ITC in areas of domestic
industry, injury, and import analysis. Such a court could also promote
a uniform application of the law and contribute to greater legal
197 See Finlayson, supra note 148.
198 See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 161.
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certainty. This approach, however, also contains its obstacles. This
approach would require the removal of the presidential override and
thus pose the danger of a court decision impacting United States
foreign policy. It would also mean the creation of a specialty court,
a move long perceived adverse to the idea that general jurisdiction
courts more readily assure a democratic element in a nondemocratic
body.
These options are purposefully vague and certainly not exclusive.
This Note simply purports to point out the existing problems con-
cerning the consistency of Section 337's administration with United
States international obligations pursuant to the General Agreement,
and to perhaps provide some avenues of thought for the redress of
these problems. Although the Panel's decision in Aramid Fibers will
play an important role in the determination of the future of Section
337, the Panel's presence already indicates the reemergence of inter-
national tension caused by the use of this section. The United States
must realize that Section 337 now exists as an albatross which will
hamper United States interests in more important areas of international
trade. The United States government, in its response before the Com-
mission in Aramid Fibers stated, "the issue in dispute was between
private parties regarding the extent of rights conferred by national
process patents, and any EEC investigation of 'illicit commercial
practices' should be based on evidence of a pattern, and not on the
basis of a single dispute. ' ' 200 The evidence of a pattern is building,
and it's time for the United States to act in its own best interest as
this unfair legal procedure is certain to reappear in the next round
of trade negotiations.
Nathan G. Knight, Jr.
Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 548.
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